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WHY JUDGES DON'T LIKE PETITIONS FOR
REHEARING
Richard S. Arnold*
INTRODUCTION
Judges seldom look favorably on petitions for rehearing.
Learned Hand, who was on the bench when Congress authorized
en banc rehearings in 1948, swore he would never vote for
one-and never did.' Few judges would go quite that far, and
some are more open than others to the suggestion of revisiting a
matter that has already been heard, discussed, considered, and
brought to a conclusion by three of their colleagues. But Hand
was hardly alone in his preference for the decided case. The
numbers tell that much. The Federal Circuit, for example, from
its inception in 1982 through 1998, granted an average of about
3.1% of petitions for panel rehearing, and only about 1.3% of en
banc petitions.2 The Tenth Circuit noted in a 1988 case that only
1.3% of all rehearing petitions in that circuit had been granted
that year.3 These figures are not atypical; in general, courts are
much less ready to grant these petitions than lawyers and
litigants are to file them.
The remarks that follow suggest an explanation from the
judges' side. I want to explain what a rehearing petition is and
what function it is supposed to perform in the procedural system
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This essay is drawn
from the author's presentation at the Eighth Circuit Appellate Practice Institute in May
2000 at the William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
1. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge 515 (1st ed., Knopf
1994).
2. The Sixteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit: Proceedings, 193 F.R.D. 263, 301 (1999).
3. Westcot Corp. v. Edo Corp., 857 F.2d 1387, 1388 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1988).
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under the applicable rules and cases. I also want to spell out just
what many judges think is wrong with the way many lawyers
and litigants use rehearing petitions. But before I do those
things, I should give the whole discussion a bit of historical
background, for sometimes it is good to remember that things
have not always been as they are now.
HISTORY OF THE REHEARING PROCESS4
The Judiciary Act of 1789, which created United States
circuit courts along with a Supreme Court and a system of
district courts, did not offer most litigants even one chance, let
alone two chances, to be heard by an intermediate appellate
tribunal. The circuit courts at that time were primarily traveling
trial courts, each composed of three judges drawn from other
federal courts. Their narrow appellate jurisdiction was rarely
exercised. The 1869 Judiciary Act created one circuit judgeship
for each judicial circuit but otherwise left the structure basically
intact: Three-judge panels composed of a circuit judge and two
other federal judges would hear mostly cases within the circuit
court's original jurisdiction.
It was not until almost the turn of the century that the
familiar three-tiered system developed. In the so-called Evarts
Act of 1891, Congress created an intermediate level of purely
appellate federal courts, the circuit courts of appeals. Like the
lower circuit courts, the courts of appeals sat in three-judge
panels, but in keeping with their distinct function they were
allotted their own judgeships, three to a circuit. The newly
instituted certiorari procedure for Supreme Court review ensured
that, for most federal appellate litigants, a three-judge panel of a
circuit court of appeals would be a court of last resort.
In the early part of the twentieth century, structural changes
in the federal appellate courts raised new issues concerning the
review process, especially en banc review. At the center of the
controversy was a puzzle of statutory interpretation. The 1911
Judicial Code, while it perpetuated the three-judge panels that
4. For a more detailed and documented historical analysis, see Tracey E. George, The
Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 Wash. L. Rev.
213 (1999), and Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-
Supreme Court," 13 J.L. & Pol. 377, 379-88 (1997). This section draws on these sources.
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the Evarts Act had set up, also provided in the very next section
that some circuits would have more than three judgeships. Did
the statute empower these circuits to sit en banc, or not? At that
time there was little need for an en banc procedure because most
appellate courts still had only three or four seats. Any panel
decision would, more likely than not, represent the judgment of
a majority of the circuit's judges. An appellant who won en banc
review could hope, at best, for a 2-2 tie or a reconsidered vote.
But as caseloads grew in the 1920s and '30s, Congress
authorized more judgeships. The issue was first decided by the
Ninth Circuit, which held in Lang's Estate v. Commissioner' that
no provision had been made for en banc review.
Sitting en banc in the case of Textile Mills Securities Corp.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,6 the Third Circuit rejected
the conclusion espoused in Lang's Estate. The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed. Among other considerations, the Court
suggested that to resolve the statutory question in favor of en
banc sittings would make for "more effective judicial
administration" because en banc review would promote finality
of decision within the courts of appeals and would aid in
resolving intra-circuit conflicts.7 These ends were thought
especially important given the increasing number of cases in
which courts of appeals provided the final hearing. Seven years
later, Congress codified the result of Textile Mills in section
46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948. The traditional three-judge
panel remained the norm, however, because en banc review had
to be approved by the majority of a circuit's active judges.
Despite its dicta in Textile Mills concerning the benefits of
en banc review, the Supreme Court was not prepared to hold that
the Judicial Code created a statutory right to a hearing by an en
banc court. In fact, the 1953 case of Western Pacific R.R. Corp.
v. Western Pacific R.R. Co.8 established the contrary. Western
Pacific made clear that courts of appeals were empowered, but
not required, to sit en banc. They were also vested with wide
discretion, not only to grant or deny such review in a given case,
but also to formulate the criteria according to which review
5. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
6. 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
7. Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 334-35.
8. 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953).
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would, in general, be granted or denied. Courts of appeals were
also able to "devise [the] administrative machinery" through
which the decision would be made. Litigants who tried to
circumvent the procedure by requesting that the question
presented be certified to the Supreme Court were generally
unsuccessful.9  The Supreme Court's 1957 decision in
Wisniewski v. United States, for example, noted the problems of
intra-circuit consistency raised by the growing number of circuit
judgeships, but discouraged courts of appeals from using the
certification process to solve them.'0 And the high court itself set
an example of liberality in the case of Cahill v. New York, New
Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co. ' where five justices voted to
grant a second petition for rehearing despite objections that it
was prohibited by the Court's own rules.
The development of the rehearing process reveals that
Congress and the Supreme Court, while persuaded that
rehearing is not only authorized but also has salutary functions
to perform, have left most questions concerning rehearing to be
answered by the officials most directly concerned-the appellate
judges themselves. Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement
as to the role of rehearing petitions in the appeals process. Let
me turn to that subject.
WHAT IS A PETITION FOR REHEARING,
WHAT DOES IT Do, AND WHY?
Before there was a question of en banc sittings, courts had
the equitable power to rehear cases within the term in which
they were decided. W.S. Simkins, glossing Equity Rule 69,
stated the traditional factors in the decision whether to appeal or
to seek equitable rehearing.
Unless you have some new and forcible ground, such as
where a mistake is palpable, or some material fact has been
overlooked by the court, it is better to appeal at once. It is
9. See e.g. Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 181 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1950); Kronberg v.
Hale, 181 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1950) (per curiam). The 1948 statute granting courts of
appeals power to certify questions of law to the Supreme Court is presently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1254(2).
10. 353 U.S. 901,902 (1957) (per curiam).
11. 351 U.S. 183, 184(1956).
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not profitable to catch at straws, or rehash old arguments,
as the result of a vast majority of these applications12
attest ....
This was good advice, because it was then the rule in all
but one circuit that no petition for rehearing would be granted or
even argued unless it was supported by a judge who had
concurred in the original judgment. 3 The Supreme Court retains
this rule.
Now that en banc hearing is explicitly allowed, a matter
already decided may be reheard either by the original panel or
by the full court. These alternatives have some substantial
differences. First, panel rehearings are more frequently granted.
Second, as the Supreme Court noted in Missouri v. Jenkins, a
timely petition for panel rehearing under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the 90-day period within which a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court must be filed, while
a bare suggestion for rehearing en banc does not. 14 These two
motions are often filed as one, leaving the choice up to the court.
Although Jenkins illustrates the hazards of such a habit, the
certiorari petitioner there, the State, was initially denied access
to the writ because it had filed hybrid "petitions for rehearing en
banc" rather than making explicit that it intended both to request
panel rehearing and to suggest en banc determination."
The first procedural consequence of a grant of rehearing is
that the original panel's judgment is vacated. This is a serious
matter, as reflected, for example, in the prerequisites for en banc
determination. While it is always within the court's discretion to
grant or to deny rehearing of any kind, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35 advises litigants that "[a]n en banc
hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure
or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the
12. W.S. Simkins, Federal Practice 877 (Lawyer's Coop. Publg. Co. 1923).
13. Id. at 1268-70.
14. 495 U.S. 33, 45-47 (1990). Note the terminology: There was technically no such
thing as a "petition for rehearing en banc." At that time, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35 used the term "suggestion" to emphasize the court's discretion. The rules
have now been clarified, and the terminology changed. The term "petition" is now used
for both panel-rehearing requests and en-banc-rehearing requests. Fed. R. App. P. 35(d)
(2000).
15. 495 U.S. at 47.
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proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." 16
With respect to rehearing of any kind, the rules reveal a greater
concern for expeditiousness than for thoroughness, the
presumption being that a decided case has already received
thorough consideration. Thus, petitions are limited to fifteen
pages, responses are not permitted unless solicited by the court,
and courts need not vote on the merits of petitions unless a judge
calls for a vote. 7 In my circuit, petitions are automatically
denied ten days after circulation unless a judge has requested a
poll, and litigants or counsel who file frivolous petitions are
subject to a monetary sanction,'8 although this sanction is
infrequently imposed. The overriding concern is to provide an
avenue for the exercise of the court's power to rehear cases,
without unduly multiplying proceedings. Nevertheless, there are
extraordinary circumstances in which justice requires the
rehearing of a decided case. Let me give a few examples from
the Eighth Circuit.
Walker v. Lockhart9 was a murder case in which the
defendant, Walker, maintained his innocence. Walker, along
with several other men, participated in a shootout in which a
police officer was killed. Although Walker had undisputedly
squared off against that officer and had himself been shot
numerous times, ballistics tests revealed that none of the guns
recovered from his person had been fired. In fact, only one of
the guns recovered from any of the suspects had been fired: It
was found on the street near where Walker fell. Walker was
convicted. After exhausting state remedies, he petitioned for
federal habeas relief, which was denied by both the district
court ° and the court of appeals." The denial of Walker's second
habeas petition22 was also affirmed by a divided Eighth Circuit
sitting en banc,23 although a majority of that court thought that
16. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1), (2) (2000).
17. Fed. R. App. P. 35(f) (2000).
18. 8th Cir. I.O.P. § IV(D) (2000).
19. 763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1985).
20. Walker v. Bishop, 295 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
21. 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969).
22. 514 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
23. 726 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984).
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the earlier habeas petition should probably have been granted. 24
Walker then filed a motion to recall the mandate,25 on the basis
that new exculpatory evidence had surfaced: Among other
things, new testimony was available which strongly suggested
that the only shot that could have killed the officer had been
fired by another man. This was enough to change my mind
about the case, and my vote gave Walker a majority and a new
trial.26 Even under these circumstances, however, four judges
dissented. A motion to recall the mandate is the functional
equivalent of an untimely petition for rehearing, and it almost
never succeeds.
The case of Clemmons v. Delo2' arose from a stabbing in a
prison. Eyewitness testimony conflicted as to whether
Clemmons was the assailant. A guard testified that he was, but
several inmates testified that another inmate, Fred Bagby, had
committed the murder. The prosecution cast doubt on the
inmates' testimony because Bagby had died and was thus an
easy scapegoat. Evidence existed, however, that less than an
hour after the stabbing, a captain of the prison guard had
interviewed an inmate who had accused Bagby of the crime.
That evidence was not given to Clemmons's attorney. Moreover,
the government introduced testimony against Clemmons in the
form of a deposition, raising serious Confrontation Clause
issues. After exhausting his state remedies, Clemmons filed a
habeas corpus petition. The district court denied it, holding that
the issues had not been properly raised in the state courts, and
our panel affirmed. In Clemmons's petition for rehearing, he
pointed out that he had presented evidence relevant to his
Confrontation Clause argument in the state habeas court. He also
corrected the panel's misunderstanding of Missouri evidence
28law in a way that affected his Brady issue. For these reasons
we granted him a panel rehearing and reversed the district
court's denial of post-conviction relief. Clemmons's death
sentence and conviction were set aside and a new trial ordered.
24. Id. (Gibson, Ross, Fagg & Bowman, JJ., with Arnold, J., concurring; Bright, Lay,
Heaney & McMillian, JJ., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1265.
26. 763 F.2d at 961-62.
27. 100 F.3d 1394 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'don rehearing, 124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. 124 F.3d at 946 n. 1.
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At the new trial, Clemmons was acquitted! (He's still in jail on
another murder conviction.)
The government also may benefit from rehearing. In United
States v. Ramos," I was a member of a panel that reversed a
drug conviction because two of us thought that the arresting
officer had performed an illegal search. On rehearing, all three
judges were persuaded that the defendants had consented to the
search, and we reversed the original panel judgment. °
All these exceptions prove the rule, however: Petitions for
rehearing are generally denied unless something of unusual
importance-such as a life-is at stake, or a real and significant
error was made by the original panel, or there is conflict within
the circuit on a point of law. In the usual course of things, cases
receive all the consideration they need the first time through.
Perhaps losing parties do not share that opinion, or perhaps they
do not understand how firmly most judges believe it. Whatever
the reason, the difference between the number of rehearing
petitions granted and the number filed is, as I have noted,
measurable in orders of magnitude.
PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS
First. There doesn't have to be a petition for rehearing in
every case. I understand that lawyers and litigants who feel
aggrieved want to say so. Still, I think lawyers should advise
their clients that very few petitions for rehearing, either by the
panel or en banc, are granted, and filing such a petition may be a
waste of the client's money. Moreover, lawyers have a duty not
to file frivolous rehearing petitions. There is a rule that provides
for the imposition of a sanction upon the filing of a frivolous or
scurrilous petition for rehearing.3' The rule is rarely invoked, but
it is there.
Second. If an attorney does file a petition for rehearing,
either by the panel or en banc, it needs to be pointed and
vigorous. It needs somehow to attract the attention of the Court.
Have in mind that most petitions for rehearing are automatically
29. 20 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearing, 42 F.3d
1160 (8th Cir. 1994).
30. Id. at 1163 n. 3 (Judge Beam concurred in the result, id. at 1164-65).
31. 8th Cir. R. 35(a)(2) (2000).
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denied with the passage of time. In most cases, no one requests a
poll on a petition for rehearing en banc, and so no actual vote is
conducted. The silence of the judges is taken to be a "no," and a
routine order is entered denying the petition in due course. In
writing a petition, the attorney must somehow strike a balance
between vigor and disrespect. Remember that three of the judges
to whom the petition is addressed (I assume here that all three
members of the panel were circuit judges in regular active
service) have already heard and rejected the attorney's position.
Occasionally, though, they can be persuaded of the error of their
ways, and it would be unwise to phrase the petition in such a
way as to be offensive. The petition should take the bark off the
tree, but gently. This of course is difficult to do, but changing
anybody's mind about conclusions already reached after
deliberation is necessarily going to be difficult.
Third. The title of this essay asks a question: Why don't
judges like petitions for rehearing? The answer should be
obvious: People don't like to be told that they are wrong. Once
in a great while, however, people, including judges, can be
brought to admit that they were wrong. Occasionally this
happens even in matters of life and death, as in the Clemmons
case, discussed above. This case alone, I suppose, justifies the
existence of the rehearing procedure, though on many days, I
confess, I find myself wishing that there were no such thing.
Fourth. Count your votes. In the Eighth Circuit, only circuit
judges who are in regular active service (that is, who have not
taken senior status) are eligible to vote on the question whether
to grant rehearing en banc. A majority of these judges must vote
in favor of the petition, or it is denied. This holds true even if
there are disqualifications or failures to participate on account of
illness or disability. For this reason, there have been cases where
a majority of those judges who voted also favored rehearing en
banc, but the petition was still denied.32 Speaking again of
Eighth Circuit procedure, if the panel of three judges that ruled
against the petitioner included a senior circuit judge, whether of
the Eighth Circuit or another circuit, or a district judge, sitting
by designation, a petitioner's chances of getting rehearing en
32. See e.g. In reAhlers, 794 F.2d 388, 414-15 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
sub norn. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (five members of the
Eighth Circuit dissent from denial of rehearing).
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banc granted may be increased, just as a statistical matter. If, for
example, the panel consists of one circuit judge in regular active
service, one senior circuit judge, and a district judge, only one
member of the panel is eligible to vote on the question of
granting rehearin& en banc. So, if the active circuit judge on the
panel dissented and voted in the petitioner's favor, the chances
of getting rehearing en banc may be enhanced. Two further
quirks: If a senior judge of the Eighth Circuit sat on the original
panel, that judge, at his or her option, will be eligible to vote on
the court en banc if rehearing en banc is granted. Such a judge
cannot vote on the petition itself, but he or she may participate
in the decision of the case if rehearing en banc is granted. In
addition, en banc decisions sometimes produce tie votes. The
Eighth Circuit presently has one vacancy, so there are only ten
active circuit judges. If the court en banc splits five to five, the
effect is to affirm the judgment of the district court, which
decides the particular case but makes no precedent. An attorney
might think that an evenly divided vote on the court en banc
would reinstate the panel opinion, but it doesn't. It affirms the
judgment of the district court.
Fifth. In some ways, petitions for rehearing by the panel
may have more chance than petitions for rehearing en banc. The
latter tend to suggest that the sky is falling, that some cosmic
error has occurred. Judges are skeptical of such claims. A
petition for rehearing by the panel, by contrast, can be very
effective if it points out the court's misunderstanding of the
record on some crucial point.
Sixth. If after considering all these points, an attorney still
wants to file a petition for rehearing, good luck. We do read
them all, though few are granted.
